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THE PRINCIPLES OF WoRLn CrnZENSIDP. By L. Jonathan Cohen.1 Oxford: 
Blackwell. 1954. Pp. viii, 103. 10S. 6d. 
The title of this volume may be somewhat misleading, but I think fortu-
nately so. Judging from the title, one might anticipate a discussion primarily 
concerned with some of the technical problems of international law in regard 
to a world government organization. However, such is not the case. Instead the 
author tenders a philosophical analysis of two of the chief socio-political prob-
lems generated by the complexities of today's international civilization: the 
necessity for maintaining a proper distribution of power so as to make possible 
the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, and the difficulties caused by 
the divided loyalty required to support both the national and international 
legal systems. 
I say the title is perhaps fortunately misleading for it may induce lawyers 
to read some philosophy. The particular volume under review may not be the 
final choice as to what philosophical material lawyers should try to digest, but 
it is intentionally written without recourse to any technical philosophical vocabu-
lary in order to reach an audience much wider than the professional philosophers 
and does deal with questions which are of peculiar interest to lawyers. In addi-
tion, Mr. Cohen may appeal to persons with legal training more than some other 
philosophers because he is not overly given to flights of fancy into the world of 
sheer metaphysical speculation. Indeed, some of what the author writes calls 
to mind a very matter of fact politician instead of a philosopher. For example, 
we are told (p. 12) that today there is no room for a new theory of political 
obligation because the only commonly advocated political revolutions are from 
one to the other of the already established systems. Therefore, instead of trying 
to find new theories of politics, we have to find the few common "thought-
ways" which make co-existence possible. 
lLecturer in Philosophy, Queen's College, Dundee, in the University of St. Andrews. 
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Now what is it that Mr. Cohen tries to do and how? 
We are forced to argue the merits of various proposals for reconciling our 
preferences with those of the earth's other two billion inhabitants. Therefore, 
the focal issues of social philosophy are (I) to what principles can we properly 
appeal in such arguments, and (2) to what policies do we commit ourselves by 
such appeal. 
There are three principles to which Mr. Cohen appeals. The first is univer-
sality; the aim is to find universally esteemed criteria of social policies since such 
unanimity guarantees that certain policies should be acceptable to all reasonable 
people. The second principle is consistency. Only those generally accepted 
"thoughtways" (pp. 7-8) will be used which are consistent with one another. 
The third general principle for social philosophy is to accept that consistent 
system of thought which least impedes "reasoned discussion of conflicting social 
policies." · 
The last-quoted phrase is the key to much of what Mr. Cohen attempts. He 
believes that the objective of social philosophy is to facilitate and encourage the 
reasoned discussion of conflicting social policies and that if the proper method 
for such discussion is advanced, then "comparatively open minded" or "reason-
able" people will be able to co-exist without recourse to violence. The consistent 
resort to reasonableness suggests a kind of faith in human reason not dissimilar 
from that often encountered in non-technical philosophic discussion. (Although, 
of course, there is also a respectable tradition in technical philosophy from which 
support could be drawn if required. ) 
A further manifestation of a kind of common-sense philosophy is indicated 
in the chapter entitled ''The Structure of Morality." In this chapter there is 
traversed terrain familiar to those with some philosophic background but prob-
ably of substantial interest to the lawyer audience to whom the volume is also 
directed. There is presented an exposition and vigorous defense of ethical 
pluralism. Part of the difficulty in achieving reasoned discussion of conflicts in 
policy is the failure in the United States and Russia to admit, as does England, 
the existence of ethical pluralism. Mr. Cohen later reveals one of the important 
advantages which in his judgment accrues from recognizing the existence of 
ethical pluralism. It is that such pluralism will help maintain the balance of 
power required for reasoned discussion of international conflicts. Were one 
ideology to dominate there would then be an upset of the power balance required 
to allow all nations to feel that participation in an international organization, 
like the United Nations, is not hopeless. 
Beginning with the third chapter, "Social Description," the tone of the 
volume under review becomes substantially more legal than philosophic. Mr. 
Cohen offers a definition of law which would strongly suggest Kelsen, but for 
the vital fact that for Mr. Cohen's purposes it is not necessary to rely ultimately 
on force in order to secure conformity to what is called law. Any regulation 
to which there is compliance, no matter how secured, is law for Mr. Cohen since 
wherever there are institutionally secured rules there is a situation where there 
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may be the need for reasoned discussions aimed at changing the rules ai:id hence 
there is need for the social philosopher. This is indeed an interesting definition 
of ''law" which, if nothing else, does at least demonstrate that the definition of 
such generic legal (and other) terms as ''law" do reflect the purposes for which 
the definition is sought or advanced. Mr. Cohen is more honest than many. 
Too often when terms such as ''law" are defined, the definer proffers his defi-
nition in the belief that the definition is necessary, immutable, and correct. 
In the last two chapters, "Loyalty to Law" and 'World Citizenship," we 
come to what are Mr. Cohen's answers to the two questions indicated above as 
critical for today's "polycentric" community. Such a community is one which, 
though it lives under a rule of law, is nonetheless "not a sovereign state nor 
a part of one, nor is any sovereign state a part of it." (p. 48) Medieval Europe 
exhibited a polycentric structure since there were ecclesiastical, municipal, and 
royal courts sharing jurisdiction. The world community today is polycentric, 
it is argued, because there are rules of international law which- are respected, 
yet neither the U .N. nor any other such structure is sovereign nor are the nation 
states any longer sovereign in the sense that they have complete control over 
their own affairs. The latter condition is true because the nations have given 
up part of their sovereignty to the United Nations, the International Court of 
Justice, and other such agencies. The best that can be said is that today's larger 
nations do retain domestic autonomy. 
By appeal to the three principles mentioned above, generality, consistency, 
and enhanced opportunity for reasoned discussion, Mr. Cohen concludes that 
there must be loyalty to law, although a decision as to when that loyalty should 
cease is not so easily achieved. However, deciding that there need be loyalty to 
law if there is to be reasoned discussion of conllicting social policies only pro-
vokes the even more serious present-day problem of what to do when there are 
conllicting loyalties. The principle for resolving this predicament, we are told, 
is that supreme allegiance is owed to the legal system which is most widely 
administered, when more than a single legal system is binding on us. (p. 70) 
It is this which is the basic principle for world citizenship. ''Citizenship" is not 
used in a technical sense; rather it is used in order to encourage people to take 
cognizance of their moral rights and responsibilities in the new world community. 
Today, we are advised, a single system of law can be administered through-
out the world because of radio and aviation. In addition, although no one 
national government can protect its citizens from bacteriological or atomic de-
struction, international control can assure the requisite safety. Because this is 
so, the author concludes that we owe our supreme loyalty to whatever inter-
national law is applied throughout the world and we have the moral duty to 
prevent violation of that international law. It also follows that we are obliged 
personally to help enforce international law if called upon to do so by a consti-
tutionally legitimate decision of the U.N. whether it is our own national gov-
ernment or another that is acting "illegally." We are further advised by Mr. 
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Cohen that we ought to oppose, in our country, those political elements which 
advocate a policy that may lead to a violation of international law. 
Such conclusions no doubt do have a certain appeal, but the appeal of a con-
clusion ought not to be identified with its soundness. We are told by Mr. Cohen 
that there is a duty to support that international law which is applied through-
out the world, and hence to support the international legal system even as 
against our national system should there be the necessity for choice. However, 
if the only international law to which we owe supreme loyalty is that which is 
universally applied, then how could there be any occasion where choice is nec-
essary? If the proper agency of the national legal system even by ludicrously 
arbitrary criteria justifies its non-conformity to what is alleged to be the inter-
national law, then that law is not being applied throughout the world and hence 
it does not merit our supreme loyalty. 
It may be that Mr. Cohen intends us to support that international law which 
is generally applied throughout the world. To use this criterion one need first 
decide when some pattern of behavior by states has occurred with sufficient 
frequency to decide that departure from such behavior is contrary to interna-
tional law. Part of this same difficulty is provoked by the fact if mere frequency 
of occurrences elevates to international law whatever state conduct enjoys a 
certain degree of repetitiveness, there would thus be ignored the possibility that 
an international law may require, in addition, a certain element of "oughtness." 
A second practical difficulty with Mr. Cohen's thesis is that individuals 
would be required to be sufficiently acquainted with what is generally accepted 
international law so that they can intelligently decide when to resist action by 
their own state which is thought contrary to the international law. This diffi-
culty is heightened by the fact that "once we approach at close quarters practi-
cally any branch of international law, we are driven, amidst some feeling of 
incredulity, to the conclusion that although there is as a rule a consensus of 
opinion on broad principle-even this may be an overestimate in some cases-
there is no semblance of agreement in relation to specific rules and problems."2 
What Mr. Cohen writes is frequently persuasive, for he does manifest philo-
sophically sophisticated common sense, and what is equally rare, writes with a 
simplicity, ease, and clarity only infrequently encountered in either philosophic 
or legal literature. However, in avoiding some of the more technical problems 
of international law which are generated by his conclusions, this reviewer be-
lieves that Mr. Cohen bas left unanswered too many questions. What makes 
this important is that the answers to some of these questions may be the condi-
tions precedent to the acceptance of the author's more general philosophic and 
legal arguments. 
Samuel I. Shuman, 
Assistant Professor of Law, 
Wayne University 
2 Lauterpacht, "Codification and Development of International Law," 49 AM. J. INT. 
L. 16 at 17 (1955); 
